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Case Comment

LABOUR LAW
Re Tilco Plastics Ltd. v. Skurjat et al.; Attorney-General for Ontario
v. Clark et al. [1966] 2 0.1?. 547.
EX PARTE INJUNCTION--CONTEMPT OF COURT.

Referring to the leading Canadian case on contempt of court for
breach of a labour injunction, Professor A. W. R. Carrothers, has
suggested:
Perhaps the most impressive feature of the Poje case, at least to one
removed from the heat of the dispute, is not the law of the case but the
events which produced it.1

The same may be said of Re Tilco Plastics v. Skurjet et al.; Attorney-General for Ontario v. Clark et al.2, a decision of the Chief
Justice of the High Court of Ontario which resulted in the jailing of
25 picketers and demonstrators. The court's response in Tilco to mass
demonstrations outside the struck Tilco Plastics plant in Peterborough
can only be understood against the background of earlier labour strife
in Oshawa. Early in 1966 a long-simmering controversy over the use

of labour injunctions approached the boiling point. Newspaper reports
predicted that Oshawa, a strong union town, would become "a battleground against the use of court injunctions in labour disputes".3 An
injunction limiting to ten the number of picketers outside the struck
Oshawa Times was met with mass picketing in numbers up to three
or four hundred.4 According to one newspaper report 5 the sheriff attempting to read the injunction was interfered with and pelted with
snowballs. The employer instituted proceedings for contempt which
came before Gale, C.J.t.C. but were withdrawn after the strike was
settled.6
On the evening before leave was granted to withdraw the Oshawa
contempt proceedings, a labour rally was held in St. Peter's Auditorium
in Peterborough. Several of those who were later to be convicted in
Tilco were present at the rally and made statements to the press that

I CARmoT HE , A. W. R., Tnm LABOUR INjuNcTION iN Banim CoLumBIA,
(Toronto: 1956), 19.
2 [19661 2 O.R. 547. Also reported in (1966) 57 D.L.R. (2d) 569. For the
subsequent history of the case see (1967) 61 D.L.R. (2d) 644. The judgment of
Gale, C.S.H.C. was upheld without reasons by the Ontario Court of Appeal.
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused both by the
Ontario Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of Canada.
3 The Globe and Mail, February 1966. All references in this casenote to
newspaper reports are taken from the collection of press reports in REPORT op
A STUDY ON THE LABOUR INJUNCTioN im ONTARIO Vol. II. (A. W. R. Carrothers,
Editor and Director of the Study, E. E. Palmer, Deputy Director of the Study.)
4 Tilco [19661 2 O.R. 547, at 553.
5 The Globe and Mail, February 3, 1966.
6 Tilco, su~rra note 4 at 554.
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mass demonstrations would be forthcoming in Peterborough. 7 It is
not clear from the judgment which of the Tilco respondents were there,
although the evidence placed Rouse, Mulders, Rutherford8 and Skurjat 9
on the platform, with Mulders as chairman of the meeting. Rutherford
on that occasion stated, "If it takes mass picketing to get the government to step in, we will be only too glad to accommodate them".10
This meeting was regarded by the court as "a particularly revealing
incident,"'' and Rutherford's announcement to the meeting about mass
picketing is referred to twice in the judgment.' 2 Partly on the basis of
this meeting, the court inferred that the subsequent events on which
the convictions of the twenty-six respondents were based, were "wellplanned and well-organized"'1 3 and that "the choice to use mass picketing was deliberate".' 4
Throughout the case it is apparent that the court regards the
Tilco mass picketing not as an isolated phenomenon, but rather as part
of a continuum of activity by union leaders designed to promote a
direct clash between the courts and the labour movement. Gale,
C.J.H.C. emphasizes the connection between the events in Oshawa
and Peterborough, and states toward the end of his judgment:
In my view it was more than a mere coincidence that the demonstrations
in Peterborough on February 23rd and 24th followed closely the incidents
in Oshawa, to which I have already alluded. Manifestly, the lawlessness
displayed in either case ought not to be condoned or allowed to be repeated.15

Further on he adds:
It was only after victory was achieved at Oshawa in the current and well
advertised war against labour injunctions that the
16 lawful activities at
Peterborough were transferred into the next battle.

This latter statement emphasizes the highly emotional atmosphere
which at all times surrounded the Tilco case. The words "victory",
"war", and "battle" underline the combative posture of the parties,
and the "war" was seen by the court not merely as a war against
7 Tilco, s pra note 4 at 567. Although the court states that "[sleveral of
the respondents made statements to the press indicating that mass demonstrations would be forthcoming," there is no finding, apart from the reference to
a certain Mr. Rutherford's announcement, of who made the statements, or of
what form the statements took.
8 Note that as the proceedings were instituted by originating notice of
motion, those charged are properly referred to not as defendants, but as
respondents. See also Tilco, supra note 4, at 573.
9 Tilco. supra note 4 at 574. It might be argued, as Skurjat was an official
of the Textile Workers, that his presence there could be just as consistent, (in
the absence of any evidence at all about his participation in the meeting) with
an innocent purpose (perhaps a report on the progress of union settlement
with thd company) unconnected with the mass demonstrations, as with a
more sinister purpose.
10 Id., at 567 and 573.
11 Id., at 567. Apart from Rutherford's statement, there is no finding In
the judgment as to what specifically happened at the meeting.
12 Id., at 567 and 573.
13 Id., at 571.
14 Id., at 567.
15 Id., at 577, (emphasis added).
16 Id., at 578.
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labour injunctions, but as an attack on the courts themselves. That
the conduct at the Tilco plant was regarded by the court not as a
quasi-political demonstration against the use of injunctions in labour
disputes, but as a well-planned frontal assault upon the authority
of the court, is apparent from the statement:
The occurences of February 23rd and February 24th at the Tilco plant in
Peterborough were not the result of impulse but rather came as part of
an organized plan, a premeditated and wilful course of conduct taken by
all respondents with a view to challenging and defying the authority of
the court.1 7

Tilco was clearly regarded by the court as having an importance
beyond the immediate facts of the case and involving principles at
the very core of the administration of justice in the province. The
decision is obviously intended as an object lesson to those who would
defy the courts, and is declared to be the public response of the
courts to the challenge openly posed by the demonstrators:
The respondents obviously sought to publicize their contempt for the
court's order. It is Incumbent upon the Court now to publicize its legitimate
and vital authority.1 8

Thus the court accepted the offer to become a party to the
conflict; the gauntlet was thrown down by the demonstrators and
picked up by the court. Was it necessary for the court to accept the
conduct of the Tilco demonstrators as a challenge, to descend to the
arena of conflict, and to assume the role of a party to the strife? To
answer these questions a review of the evidence is necessary.
The employees of Tilco Plastics, represented by the Textile
Workers Union, went out on a legal strike December 14, 1965. On
December 17, 1965, Haines J. granted an ex parte interim injunction
prohibiting all picketing for three days. On December 20, the injunction was varied and extended on consent of the parties by King J.
The order of King J. allowed a maximum of twelve picketers at the
Tilco plant, enjoined interference with free access to the plant, and
was in form addressed to "the defendants, their servants, representatives and agents or any person or persons acting under their instructions or persons having notice of this order". The order also
enjoined the "ordering, abetting, counselling, procuring or encouraging in any manner whatsoever whether directly or indirectly, any
person or persons to commit the aforesaid acts or any of them". 19
Although the only respondents named in the injunction were
Clark and Skurjat,20 the court was later to find in the contempt
proceedings that anyone who took an active part in the demonstrations was well aware of the injunction order.
The demonstrations took place on February 23 and February 24
of 1966. The number of participants varied and at times were esti17 Id., at 579.

18 Id., at 580.
19 Id., at 551.
20 Id., at 574, 581.
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mated as high as three hundred and fifty. Photographs and witnesses
depicted
a long moving human belt running along both edges of a five-foot
sidewalk and extending from the southerly limit of the company's premises on Park Street to the westerly limit of the company's premises on
Parkhill Road. 21
...

A variety of signs were carried by the demonstrators. A number
made reference to labour injunctions generally, and others referred
specifically to support for the Tilco strikers. 22 There was evidence
of two fairly distinct groups - one comprising the mass demonstrators and one composed of Tilco employees under the direction of the
respondent Clark, an official of the Textile Workers Union. Skurjat,
also a Textile Workers official, spent most of his time at the strike
headquarters across the street although photographs placed him on
two occasions near the demonstrations and, as mentioned above, he
was evidently on the platform at the meeting on February 10.23
A circular (Exhibit M) which bore the heading "Why Are the
Working Citizens of Peterborough Demonstrating?" and issued by
the Peterborough Labour Council Injunctions Committee was distributed to demonstrators and passers-by. 24
The respondents were apparently served with the originating
notice of motion to commit for contempt sometime on February 24.25
On February 25, the number of pickets at the Tilco plant was twelve
or less, and the demonstrations which formed the subject of the prosecution had been terminated. The court, referring to the institution of
contempt proceedings against the respondents, stated:
The irresistible conclusion is that the decision to discontinue the demonstrations was coincident
with service of the notice of motion in this matter
on the respondents. 26

On the evening of February 24, a press release was read at a
meeting in the Peterborough Labour Council Hall. In the release,
Mulders, president of the Peterborough Labour Council, is quoted as
saying:
Twenty-eight demonstrators have been served with subpoenas. We have
accomplished what 27
we set out to do and there is no point in continuing
the demonstrations.
at 554.
at 566.
at 574-757.
at 567.
25 The judgment does not state exactly when the notice was served, but at
550, the court notes that Wilson J. on February 24 granted leave to the
Attorney-General to examine certain witnesses iva voce, and it appears from
the context of evidence reviewed at 556-567 that the notice must have been
served some time prior to the meeting which took place on the evening of
February 24.
26 Tilco, supra note 4, at 556.
27 Id., at 574.
21
22
23
24

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
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and further:
It is now up to the courts.2

In the same release, Rouse, described as spokesman for the
demonstrators, asked provincial trade unionists to support a private
member's bill, then pending in the legislature, to amend the Judica-

ture Act with respect to labour injunctions.

29

On the evidence the court found twenty-six of the twenty-seven
respondents guilty of criminal contempt of court; Clark and Skurjat
because as parties named in the original injunction they counselled
and aided others in disobeying it,30 and the others for
•.. treating the Court's process with contempt, by deliberately acting in
defiance of it and in aiding others to do so.31

A number of elements of this case compel comment. First, the
evidence with respect to the activities of Clark and Skurjat deserves
close attention. It was urged on Clark's behalf that he
.. was at all times merely a supervisor of the female pickets who were
said to
be picketing the plant entrances in compliance with the court
order.32

and further, that
• . . the two groups remained distinct at all times, that Clark and his
group had a right to be where they were and that no fault or connection
was to
be attributed to Clark for or with the massive picketing taking
33

place.
Sifflarly, it was argued that Skurjat, also an official of the
Textile Workers, spent his time at the strike headquarters and not
on the picket line; Gale, C.J.H.C. indeed conceded that there was no
evidence to show that Skurjat was an active participant in the picket
line, and stated that he was prepared to treat both Clark and Skurjat
on the basis that neither of them actually engaged in the demonstration.34
Thus we have a finding that neither man engaged directly in
the demonstration which was found to be a public defiance of the
courts, yet both were convicted and sentenced to jail for two months.
It becomes important to examine the evidence which connects them
with the prohibited conduct. On the first morning of the demonstrations, a picture was taken of Clark, Skurjat, and others conferring
on the company lawn with the Chief of Police. Shortly after that
conversation, both were seen conferring with the Sheriff, who attempted to read the injunction order aloud, but was drowned out
by the shouting of the demonstrators. On another occasion, Clark
and Skurjat were seen with an unknown female picketer on the west
Id., at 574.
29 Id., at 574.
30 Id., at 575.
31 Id., at 576.
32 Id., at 575.
33 Id., at 575.
34 Id., at 575.

28

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.5:267

side of Park Street. Skurjat was also seen talking with both Rouse
and Mulders in the vicinity of the strike headquarters 35 - this
in itself hardly seems sinister - and was noticed by a witness on the
platform at the February
10 meeting some two weeks before the
36
illegal conduct occurred.
While it would require the utmost navetd to infer from these
facts that Clark and Skurjat were unsympathetic to the prohibited
conduct, the conclusion that they actively aided and abetted the prohibited conduct is somewhat less than compelling. According to the
terms of the injunction granted by King J., the Textile Workers
Union had a right to have twelve pickets outside the Tilco plant. As
officials of that union, it would only be natural for Clark and Skurjat
to attend to supervise the legal picketing. It would not be unnatural,
as officers responsible for the legal picketing, to confer with the
Sheriff and the Chief of Police when those gentlemen appeared on
the scene.
Gale, C.J.H.C., however, states:
Those two respondents would have had this Court believe that they were
in the nature of innocent bystanders to the mass picketing, that they were
powerless to discourage it, that it was none of their doing. Photograph
J9 shows them in conference with the Sheriff who is telling them about
the dnjunction and the reading to take place. Why did they not protest
their innocence at that point? Why did they not tell the Sheriff that It
was none of their doing and retire from the group? Photograph J8 shows
Mr. Clark conferring with the Chief and others. The Chief is relating
police concern over the demonstration.
Why did Clark not then state the
position which was taken before me? 37
With respect, one might ask whether there was any duty on
either Clark or Skurjat to protest their innocence at that point to
the Sheriff or the "Chief". Neither Clark nor Skurjat had been
charged; neither were under arrest; it is not as if they sought to
establish an alibi which to be effective as a defence must be raised
at the earliest opportunity. Their defence was that they were engaged in lawful conduct and had every right to do what they were
doing. Surely there is no duty on innocent men in such circumstances
to "protest their innocence". As for "retiring from the group" it is
difficult to see how willingness on the part of a citizen to confer
with officers of the law can be tortured into an inference of guilt.
From the evidence it is apparent that the conduct of Clark
and Skurjat falls somewhere on the scale which stretches from active
aiding and abetting on one hand to passive acquiescence or indifference on the other. Their position on that scale depends on one's
working premises; the relative weight one attaches to the competing
values of freedom of expression and order, liberty and authority;
one's view of the validity of the goals to which the conduct, sought
to be impugned, is directed; the extent to which one is prepared to
find conspiracy in the similar activities of various groups and indi35 Id., at 574, 555.

36 Id., at 558.
37 Id., at 575.
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viduals. The drawing of inferences from evidence such as this is by
no means a dry mechanical process, and the result depends on a
host of unarticulated values and premises..
The form of Gale, C.J.H.C.'s rhetorical questions indicates a
certain lack of sympathy with the position taken by Clark and Skurjat. Let us posit that they had nothing to do with the mass demonstrations, but were continuing the supervision of the members of
the union, who continued to picket during the mass demonstrations
as they had done both before and after the course of the illegal
activity. Especially in the absence of findings as to what words passed
between the participants at the conferences with the Sheriff and the
Chief of Police, how can a duty arise in such circumstances to protest
one's innocence? Gale, C.J.H.C.'s question indicates a circular argument; Clark and Skurjat are guilty because they did not protest their
innocence, and they did not protest their innocence because they were
guilty.
One particular area of the judgment where some sort of unarticulated premise shows itself is in Gale, C.J.H.C.'s statement:
If trade unions feel that present legislation is unfair or unrealistic and
that they should have unbridled power to use mass picketing,
then they
should seek proper channels for bringing about a change.38

The word 'unbridled' carries with it certain emotional undertones. The entry opposite the word in Roget's Thesaurus reads:
unbridled, adj. unrestrained: violent, licentious; unruly, intractable. See
VIOLENCE. Ant., see MODERATION.39

and conveys something of the flavour which attaches to the word
'unbridled' in popular usage. The use of such a word, which carries
distinct overtones of violence, in a reference to trade union objectives, imports a strong association of disapproval.
Another point of interest in the case focuses on Exhibit M, the
handbill distributed among the demonstrators and passers-by. Gale,
C.J.H.C. says of it:
It imputes to the Courts an unholy and biased approach in the granting
of labour injunctions and
indeed, it is a document which, in my view, is
scandalous to the courts.4 O

Although the handbill is not quoted in the judgment, Gale,
C.J.H.C. later refers to it with the comment:
For the leaders of that campaign to suggest that the Court grants injunctions to employers as a matter of course, without necessary proof
on their
part is to impute to the Court a biased and improper approach.41

making it clear that he is referring to a passage in the bill which
states:
Id., at 577.
39 THE NEw AwmEPCAm
38

377.

40

RoGET's COLLEGE THESAURUS

Tilco, supra note 4, at 567.

41 Id., at 578.

(Signet Books, 1960)
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That the employer has refused to bargain in good faith, or has rejected
all peacemaking efforts, seems to merit no legal consideration by the
courts. Even if the employer comes into court with unclean hands, the
courts grant the restraining order 42or injunction as a matter of course, as
though it were his inalienable right.
The paragraph of the handbill preceding the above excerpt had

referred to ex parte injunctions, 43 and although it is not clear from
the handbill, the context makes it likely that the impugned passage
is a reference to ex parte injunctions. There is very little law on what
constitutes a scandal to the courts. It is obvious that the totality of

the surrounding circumstances might render scandalous something
not otherwise scandalous. However his Lordship appears to base his

finding that the document is scandalous to the courts, not on the
basis of the circumstances under which it was published and distributed, but rather on its contents.
It

is interesting in this context to note that Casey J. of the

Quebec Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal Side), stated in the course
of his judgment in Hdbert that the dominant factor in cases of an

alleged scandal on the courts was the right to criticize. 44 He suggests
that a balance be struck between the benefits of free discussion and

the necessity of defending established institutions, and concludes:
Having weighed in this way the interference with justice against other
aspects of the public interest, if the scales come down in favour of the
latter we do not consider
that the act complained of should be regarded
as a contempt at all. 4 5

Although on its facts He'bert is very different from Tilco, some
of the principles which it lays down, such as the above, are worthy
46
of notice.
42 The handbill is not quoted in the judgment, but there Is a copy in the
appeal book. Its closing words-"If you think this injunction law should be
changed, why not join us?"-emphasizes that the main thrust of the demonstration was not directed towards the Tilco strike itself, but toward the
political campaign against labour injunctions. However as the court points
out (at 566) in rebutting the argument that the demonstrators' activity was
not 'picketing' (and thus not within the terms of the injunction), at least a few
of the signs carried by the demonstrators referred to the Tilco strike itself.
43 "On these occasions the employer requests an ex parte injunction,
which is obtainable without the prior knowledge of the strikers, and thus cannot be defended by the workers."
44 HMbert v. Procureur G~ndrale de Ia Province de Qu6bec, [1966) B.R.
197. (Cour du Banc de la Reine (en appel)).
45 In Regina v. Glanzer, [1963) 2 O.R. 30, the Ontario High Court of
Justice did not focus on the right to criticize, but on the necessity of "... preserving the processes of justice from abusive, nasty, vulgar articles . .
(at 36) and imposed a fine of $4,000 on the respondent. See Hdbert, supra
note 44, at 222
46 The court (at 561 and 562) points out the great differences which distinguish Hdbert (apparently unreported at that time) from Tilco. It is interesting however to note that in Tilco, the court, in determining the nature of
the contempt, states its finding as a conclusion: "Because of the large
numbers of persons involved and the public nature of the defiance of the
Court order, patently there was a public depreciation of the authority of the
Court and the administration of justice." (576) In H~bert, Tremblay, C.J.
takes a further step and applies the evidence to a more general test: "Je dois
considrer le quCbecois moyen et me demander si les observations faits par
l'appelant a l'6gard du juge sont de nature A lui faire perdre confiance dans
les tribunaux et A emp~cher ceux-ci de remplir leur rble."
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It must be kept in mind that at the time the handbill was circulated, the use of injunctions in labour disputes was a very active
political issue. To find scandalous to the courts such a comparatively
mild statement, on an issue where emotions on both sides ran strong,
indicates a rather high degree of sensitivity on the part of the Court.
This sensitivity is further demonstrated when Gale, C.J.H.C.
undertakes to defend the existing state of the law with respect to
the granting of injunctions in labour disputes - "The law with respect
,47
to the granting of injunctions in labour disputes is not onerous ....
and to make some general observations on the right to strike "There appears to be a misconception among certain leaders and
members of trade unions, concerning the respective privileges of
employers and employees...48
The mass demonstrations arose out of activity which was directed, ultimately, towards a political goal - legislative amendments to
the Judicature Act with respect to labour injunctions. 49 In pursuit
of that goal, the law was broken. In convicting those who broke the
law, the presiding judge did not confine himself to commenting on
the breach of the law, but undertook to give his view on the political
issue which motivated the breach. When Gale, C.J.H.C. chose to
defend the existing state of the law with respect to injunctions in
labour disputes, he placed himself in the position of appearing to
support the cause of one side of a live political issue. In doing so,
he provided a target for a great deal of virulent abuse which promptly
emanated from certain quarters. For instance, one trade union official
was quoted in a newspaper report as saying:
The judge has in fact exceeded his jurisdiction and engaged in an impertience that the political life of the province cannot accept - of using the
bench as a rostrum for presenting opinions on such matters as ex parte
injunctions which have been in the political arena. He is entitled to interpret the law. He is not entitled to turn the courts into a soap box for
reactionary views on political issues presently before the public.50
The extremism and demagoguery of this statement speak for
themselves. Nevertheless, if the judgment had made no reference to the
political issue - the state of the existing law on labour injunctions
- this sort of irresponsible comment would have found no mark.
47 Tilco, supra note 4, at 577. For an opposite view of the injunction
power in labour disputes, see Robinson v. Adams, (1924) 56 O.L.R. 217, at 224,
where Middleton J.A., after criticizing the use of injunctions in labour disputes
concludes with the ringing phrase "Government by injunction is a thing
abhorrent to the law of England and of this province."
4s Tilco, supranote 4, at 578.
49 As already mentioned, the last paragraph of the handbill, Exhibit M,
states "If you think this injunction law should be changed, why not join us?"
The political
the at
demonstrations
further
underlined
a passage
from
a press nature
release of
made
the February is
24th
meeting,
quoted by
by the
court:
"Mr. Stanley Rouse, president of local 872 1AMV, and spokesman for the
demonstrators, asked trade unionists across the province to solicit the support
of their Provincial members of the Legislature for Bill 25, an act to amend
the Judicature Act, which was introduced by Mr. James Renwick, (ND?.
Riverdale)
Tilco,
supraand
notereceived
4, at 574.its first reading in the house on February 3, 1966."
50 The Globe and Mail, June 28, 1966.
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In accepting the challenge of the Tilco and Oshawa demonstrators
to become a party to the "battle" against the use of labour injunctions, Gale, C.J.H.C. placed the court in a position where it was no
longer above the conflict about labour injunctions, but could be
made to appear to be taking one side in the controversy. If the court
had confined its comments to the illegality of the conduct, without
going into the more general issues which lay behind it, there would
likely have been fewer of what Gale, C.J.H.C. referred to, in passing
sentence, as:
...
the often irresponsible but more often unpremeditated and illogical
statements and comments that apparently
have been made since the release of my judgment in this matter.... 51

In determining the sentence to be meted out to the respondents,
Gale, C.J.H.C. stressed that the governing principle was to be neither
reformation, as the respondents were persons of normally good character, nor retribution in the sense of revenge. Considering the necessity of cautioning citizens
•.. against all forms of defiance of the law, even if inspired by allegedly

legitimate goals ... 52

and stressing the openness with which the defiance of the courts was
staged, he declared that the primary objective in the determination
of sentences should be deterrence. 53 The leaders were accordingly
sentenced to two months in jail, and the other respondents to 15 days.
There is virtually no guideline, either from statute or precedent,
for the determination of a sentence for criminal contempt of court
of this nature. In an earlier case, where it had been argued that a
judge exercising his summary power to commit for contempt committed in the face of the court was bound by certain statutory limits
on length of sentence, it was pointed out that:
...
in discharging his discretionary power to punish for contempt committed before him, he is not governed by the provisions of the Criminal
Code as to penalties. .. 54
51 Tilco, supra note 4 at 579. On the next page of the judgment, the
court, in referring to the absence of a sincere and genuine apology by the
respondents, remarked: "Indeed, if press reports are accurate, it would seem
that the respondent Skuriat and others are still endeavouring to mislead the
public as to the nature and effect of this proceeding." It is not clear what
statements are referred to, whether the court is taking judicial notice of
comments attributed to Skurjat, or what weight and relevance is given to
them
52 Tilco, supranote 4, at 580.
53 In Re Bolton and County of Wentworth (1911), 23 O.L.R. 390, a case of
civil contempt, cited in Tilco on the issue of strictness of proof of service,
Middleton J. stated (at 395): "The jurisdiction to punish for contempt is one
that should be most sparingly exercised, and in cases such as this should be
regarded as coercive and not punitive.. .". That Tilco is a criminal contempt
distinguishes it from Bolton, but insofar as the criminal contempt jurisdiction
is coercive as well as deterrent, one might note that in Tilco the court found
that the decision to stop the demonstrations was coincident with the institution
of contempt proceedings. (See supra notes 25 and 26.) Thus the coercive
element of the contempt jurisdiction had been discharged even before the case
came on for trial.
54 Ex Parte Lunan, (1951) 11 C.R. 340.
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In fact the scope of judicial discretion in sentencing for contempt

of court is so wide that during the Parliamentary debate on the
revision of the Criminal Code the then leader of the opposition was

moved to remark
It does seem to me that this is a most extraordinarily open-ended power
in the hands of any judge, no matter how much we may respect our
judiciary, to leave him completely free to decide what the penalty should
be ...I know of nothing at all that suggests any uniform pattern. It is
entirely at the whim of the judge himself.55
Actually there are so few cases on this sort of contempt that
it is impossible to state that a pattern exists - there is just not a
large enough sample on which the existence of a pattern may be
based. In Poje,56 where the facts were somewhat similar to those of
Tilco, the leader of the demonstrations was sentenced to three months
in jail and a fine of $3,000. In GeneraZ Printers v. Thomson,57 a case
involving contemptuous breach of a labour injunction accompanied
by threats and violence, the sentence was 15 days - although the
Thomson case involved a civil contempt, whereas the contempt in
Tilco was found to be criminal. 58 In Lunan59 a witness was sentenced
to a year for refusing to testify. In R. v. Neae, 60 a British Columbia
Case with a great many similarities to Tilco, the leaders of a demonstration which involved an assault upon a police officer were sentenced to 6, 4, and 3 months, depending on their degree of participation. Compared to these latter two decisions, the Tilco sentences
are mild. It could be argued that because of the peacefulness of the

49

55 Hon. George Drew, HAwsAPD, June 3, 1954, at 5471.
56 [1953J 1 S.C.R. 516, affirming (1952) 6 W.W.R. 473 and (1952) 7 W.W.R.

57 (1964) 46 D.L.R. (2d) 697.
58 The contemnor in Thomson threw stones at a non-striker's car and on
a later occasion tore the ignition wires from the distributor cap of the same
car. He also let the air out of another car's tires and assaulted a 17 year old
youth, threatening him with physical harm and saying that he (the youth)
was as good as dead if he continued to work for his employer. The court
described the nature of the proceedings as "quasi-criminal." (699) In cases
such as this, the distinction between contempts criminal and contempts civil
is, to say the very least, blurred. As one learned author has noted; ....
identical behaviour may rightly be classified as criminal or civil contempt,
depending on the person of the contemnor or the purpose of the classification.
... It is difficult to predict when in any given case the court will classify a
contemnor's behaviour as civil contempt . . . the law of contempt, at least

with respect to its criminal and non-criminal aspects, is shrouded in obscurity."
Fisher, Hugo, CiviZ and CriminaZ Aspects of Contempt of Court (1956)
34 CAN. BAR REv. 121 at 162-63. This distincton, blurred as it is, could become
absolutely crucial in the application of section 9 of the Criminal Code,
especially if there is any merit in the constitutional issue raised by the then
Minister of Justice when the new Criminal Code was being debated -in Parliament: 'With regard to contempt of court committed in a civil court, without
going into the matter too carefully, I would be inclined to think that an appeal
from a citation for contempt of court occuring in provincial courts exercising
civil jurisdiction would more than likely have to be provided by provincial
legislation." HAASAm, June 3, 1954, at 5475.
59 (1951) 11 C.R. 340.
60 (1966) 67 C.L.L.C. 14016 (B.C. C.A.).
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demonstration 61 and the fact that the respondents were apparently
first offenders, the Tilco sentences were somewhat severe. But it is
apparent that Gale, C.J.H.C. gave the question of sentencing the most
thorough and painstaking consideration, and in light of his findings
with respect to the gravity of the offence and the threat it posed
to the administration of justice and to public respect for the law,
the sentences could very easily be regarded as mild. In the absence
of a number of comparable cases, it would be difficult to find any
solid basis for describing the sentences as severe.
An interesting legal aspect of the Tilco case involves the right
to jury trial in cases of criminal contempt of court. Counsel for the
respondents argued
...that the Attorney-General ought to have proceeded by indictment
pursuant to Section
108 of the Criminal Code, and not by originating
notice of motion. 62

Section 108 of the Criminal Code reads:
Every one who, without lawful excuse, disobeys a lawful order made by
a court of justice or by a person or body of persons authorized by any Act
to make or give the order, other than an order for the payment of money

is, unless some penalty or punishment or other mode of proceeding Is

expressly provided by law, guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to
imprisonment for two years.

The court responded to this argument by stating:
The section itself contains the answer to this objection in the words 'unless

some penalty or punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly
provided by law'. The Attorney-General is seeking to invoke
the inherent
63
power of the Court to punish summarily for contempt ....

and continuing at some length on the history of the inherent power
of superior courts of record to punish for contempt, referring as well
to Section 8 of the Criminal Code. Section 8, which abolishes common law offences, contains the saving clause:
but nothing in this section affects the power, jurisdiction or authority
that a court, judge, justice or magistrate had, before the coming into force
of this Act, to impose punishment for contempt of court.
With respect, the court does not directly answer the problem
posed by the presence of the words "expressly provided" in Section
108. While there is some authority for the proposition that the word
'expressly' can under certain circumstances mean 'impliedly', 64 the
very fact that the contempt power is described by the court as in61 The Attorney-General did not even allege that the respondents were in
breach of that part of the injunction of King J. which banned molestation or
intimidation. Tilco, supra note 4. In commenting on the potential menace
posed by the demonstration the court stated, "that no violence erupted was
undoubtedly due to the skill and judgment of the police and the restraint
exercised by the demonstrators and their leaders." (Tilco, at 556) The court
later notes: "There is the further evidence of the Deputy Chief of Police who
was told by the organizers of the demonstration that a body of 30 to 35 men
had been formed to patrol the demonstration line and to keep order."
62 Tilco, supranote 4, at 559.
63 Id.
64 Rex ex reZ. MacGinnish v. Hassell, [1937] 1 W.W.R. 726 (B.C. B.S.). Re
-..

Browne, [1944] 1 D.L.R. 365.
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herent would seem to negate the proposition that it is "expressly
provided". And Section 8 of the Criminal Code, while it recognizes
the existence of the inherent power and saves it from a common
grave with the other common law offences, could hardly be said to
'provide' the mode of proceeding which, according to Rex v. Almon, 65
has existed from time immemorial.
Although this argument in itself may seem unduly semantic,
the issue is crucial. If the Attorney-General is obliged to proceed by
the route provided in Section 108, the accused has the right to trial
by jury. However if the Attorney-General is allowed to invoke the
court's inherent power and to proceed summarily by originating notice
of motion, the respondent is denied the right to jury trial.
66
The issue was adverted to in Nissho v. Longshoremen's Union,
a contempt of court action which also arose out of the breach of a
labour injunction. In Nissho, the argument that the Attorney-General
must proceed, where possible, by the route of Section 108 was rejected
by Wilson, C.J.S.C. who was not convinced that he could,

where two valid alternative methods of procedure are open 67to the Attorney-General, say that he must adopt one rather than the other.
There is a strong current of judicial opinion to the contrary. In
R. v. Davies,6s Wills J., although holding that the case before him
(newspaper comments prejudicing the fair trial of an accused) was
a proper one for the exercise of the summary process stated:
It is true that the summary remedy, with its consequent withdrawal of
the offence from the cognizance of a jury, is not to be resorted to if the
ordinary methods of prosecution can satisfactorily accomplish the desired
result, namely,
to put an effectual and timely check upon. such mal69
practices.

A similar approach is taken in He'-bert;70 where Tremblay, C.J.
says of the procedure:
65 Cited in Tilco at 559.
66 (1966) 54 W.W.R. 295 (B.C. S.C.) (In Chambers). From the dates of
the cases it would appear that it is to one of the Nissho decisions that the
court (in TiZco) refers to at 579: "I have also familiarized myself with the
cases which seem to be relevant on this issue. Indeed I have read one that
was delivered a week ago in British Columbia. I managed to get a copy of it.
It is the most recent." The report of Nissho ((1966) 54 W.W.R. 295) does not
deal with the case on its merits, but consists of a number of interim rulings.
The Nissho case itself is reported in (1965) 66 C.L.L.C. 14113, and although
the terms of the sentence do not appear in the judgment itself, the subsequent
case of Regina v. Neale, (1966) 67 C.L.L.C. 114016 indicates that in Nissho "a
very substantial fine" was imposed.
67 (1966) 54 W.W.R. 295 at 301. Technically this is mere obiter dictum,
as the court found itself unable at that stage of the proceedings to determine
whether the contempt was civil or criminal: "To hold that he is bound to
utilize section 108 of the Criminal Code is to hold that the matters alleged in
his notice of motion constitute criminal contempt. I do not think that I can
in the present state of the authorities so hold before hearing the evidence."
68 [1906] 1 K.B. 32.
69 Id. at 41.
70 Supra note 44.
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Ce pouvoir ne doit 8tre exercd qu'avec une tr~s grande prudence, avec
angoisse, et seulement dans le cas ou il est necessaire d'agir avec urgence
pour permettre aux tribunaux de continuer A remplir leur fonction.7 1

These dicta are of particular relevance in a case like Tilco where
the court found that the prohibited conduct ceased as soon as the
contempt proceedings were instituted and there was no apparent
urgency in having the matter proceed speedily to trial. Of course on
the facts of Hebert, as the court points out in Tilco,7 2 the summary
proceedings were much more summary than those afforded to the
respondents in Tilco. But the principle remains that any diminution
of the rights of the accused, including the right to jury trial, is to
be guarded against and resorted to only in the most extreme circumstances. Even in Nissho, Wilson, C.J.B.C. says of the argument based
on the right to jury trial through Section 108 of the Criminal Code:
But the general thought behind it, that if a man Is entitled to trial by
jury, he should not be deprived of that right except by the letter of the
law, appeals to me.7 3

To succeed with this argument, it is necessary to leap the considerable hurdle posed by Poje.74 There, Kellock, J. made an express
finding that there had been a breach of Section 165 (now Section
108) of the Criminal Code (and, by inference, that an alternative to
the summary procedure was available) yet he found no fault with
the form of the proceedings by originating notice of motion. Against
this authority it could be urged that the argument on the right to
jury trial based on the wording of Section 108 was not raised and
that no case is authority for a proposition that was not before the
court. Alternatively it could be argued that much of the judgment
of Kellock, J. is obiter dictum - that he needed only to find that
Farris C.J. had jurisdiction to hear the application for committal
Kerwin and Estey, JJ., who dismissed the appeal on the narrow
jurisdictional ground, specifically refused to comment on other aspects
of the case.
Another obstacle to the argument on the right to jury trial based
on the wording of Section 108 is presented by the case of In re Gerson7 5 where the court referred to Section 165 (which corresponds to
the present Section 108) and Section 180(d) (which corresponds to
the present Section 119) and stated:
The argument on this point was that the appellant could be prosecuted
under either of these sections and that these proceedings being available
the right of the Court to punish for a contempt of court had been abrogated.
Without deciding whether either of these sections would apply in the
circumstances, we are of opinion that even if that were so it is a necessary
incident to every superior court of justice to imprison for a contempt of
court committed in the face of it...
That right persists and has not been
abrogated by either of the sections of the Criminal Code referred to...
71 Id., at 216.
72 Tilco, supra note 4, at 562.
73 Supra note 66, at 300.
74

Supra note 56.

75 [1946] S.C.R. 547. See also In Re Mat Simmons Nightingale, [1946]
S.C.R. 538.
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In response to this case, one might argue that the contempt in
Gerson was committed in the face of the court, and was therefore a
much more direct affront to the administration of justice than a
contempt, like Tilco, not committed in the face of the court.7 6 It must
also be remembered that Gerson, arising out of the refusal of a
witness to testify in one of the post-war "spy" cases, involved an
urgent issue of national security and that it may have been too
cumbersome and time-consuming in such an emergency to resort to
77
proceedings by indictment.
It is quite apparent that this question of the right to jury trial
in contempt cases is still in England an open question. Pearson, L.J.
remarked in Be Atty.-Gen.'s Application; Atty.-Gen. v. Butterworth:
In this case it has not been contended on either side that there is an
alternative procedure by indictment (which, though said to be disused,
could be revived) and that it would be a more suitable procedure in this
case on the grounds that, after the conclusion of proceedings, there is
prima facie no pressing need for prompt disposal of the matter, and trial
by jury would be appropriate for determining the intention or purpose of
each of the defendants in voting for or otherwise helping to procure the
removal of Greenlees from his offices. The decision in this appeal does not
preclude
any submission on those lines which may be made in any future
case.78
Whether it is an open question in Canada is more doubtful.
Although there has been no decision directly on the point, it seems in
light of Gerson, Poje, Nissho and now TilZco7 9 that the argument that
the right to jury trial may be preserved in contempt cases by the
wording of Section 108 of the Criminal Code, would meet short shrift.
It is unfortunate that this issue, involving the liberty of the subject
and the ancient and fundamental right to trial by jury, has never
been directly met by the courts.
76 In the United States some jurisdictions have expanded their power to
punish for contempt committed in the face of the court by inventing the
ctional category of "contempts constructively committed in the face of the
court". See GOLDFARB, R. L., TBE CONTEMPT POWER (Columbia University
Press, 1963).
77 For the background of these "spy" cases see Hard Cases Make Bad
Law, (1967) January, CrcrTY's L.J., 1.
78 [1962] 3 W.L.R. 819 at 840. Quoted in Nissho, supra note 66, at 300.
79 The Court in Tilco refers to Be Campbell and Cowper, (1934) 63 C.C.C.
36 (Alta. C.A.) for authority that the right of the courts to proceed summarily
against contempts is well entrenched and virtually unquestioned. It had been
argued in Campbell that instead of proceeding summarily it would have been
more appropriate to proceed under section 180 of the Criminal Code (the 'obstruction of justice' section, now section 119). Mitchell J.A. replied: "This
section however is restricted to and covers only that class of contempt in
which the words 'wilfully attempts' would be applicable and might fall far
short of providing a remedy for the offence now before us, for in my opinion
a charge prosecuted under this section under the facts of this case might
result in a dismissal and a most serious offence against the course of justice
go unpunished." With respect, this indicates a grave potential danger in the
use of the summary process. The procedure can be used to invoke an 'inherent' jurisdiction which is poorly defined and which may well visit with
criminal liablity conduct not otherwise unlawful. In the particular example
of the Campbell case, it was used to avoid the necessity of proving mens rea
and thus, by the court's own admission, the ambit of the criminal law was
expanded by the exercise of judicial discretion.
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Although one might raise a few questions of fact or law in connection with the Tilco decision, it cannot be seriously disputed in
the result that the respondents (with the possible exception of Clark
and Skurjat) were aware of the probable consequence of their actions
and got what they bargained for. Having deliberately set for themselves a collision course with the courts they cannot be heard to complain of the resulting impact. Having held themselves out as sacrificial
lambs for their political cause, it would lie ill in their mouths to
complain of their jail sentences.
ARcHIE GRAY CAMPBELL"

MORTGAGES
Sidmay Ltd. et al. v. Whettam Investments Ltd. (1966), 54 D.L.R.
(2d) 194; [19661 1 O.R. 457; (1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 358 (Ont. C.A.)
MORTGAGES-ILLEGALITY.
NOTE:
The decision in the Sidmay case becomes more significant when
one considers the consequences that would have arisen had the
decision at trial been upheld. Thus, in addition to dealing with
the reasons given by the Court of Appeal, the writers discussed
at length the judgment of Grant J. at trial.

Perhaps no case decided within the last few years has caused
as much controversy as the Sidmay case.' The implications of the
trial decision threw both the business community and the legal profession of Ontario into a state of uncertainty regarding the consequences of non-registration under "lending" statutes. At trial, failure
to register under the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct 2 resulted in a
windfall to a borrower; however, the Court of Appeal unanimously
reversed this decision.3 It is the purpose of this note to examine the
efficacy and reasoning of these results.
Background and Facts
At trial, the plaintiff brought an action for a declaration that a
mortgage given by the defendant Company was null and void as
against the plaintiff mortgagor since the defendant had failed to
register under the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct. The defendant
was in the business of lending money on the security of real estate;
to this end, it was registered under both the CorporationsAct 4 and
the Mortgage Broker's RegistrationAct.5 Since Whettam Investments
* Archie Gray Campbell is a member of the 1967 graduating class of
Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 Sidmay Ltd. et aZ. v. Whettam Investments Ltd. (1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d)
358 (Ont. C.A.).
2 R.S.O. 1960, c. 222, s. 133.
3 Supra, note 1.
4 R.S.O. 1960, c. 71, s. 3(1).
5 R.S.O. 1960, c. 244.

